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A commentary on
Multimodal theories of recognition and their relation to Molyneux’s question
by Altieri, N. (2015). Front Psychol. 5:1547. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01547
Altieri (2015) discusses the relevance of experimental work on cross-modal recognition to a
question raised by the Irish politician William Molyneux and discussed in John Locke’s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding:
“Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a Cube, and
a Sphere ..., so as to tell, when he felt one and t’other, which is the Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then
the Cube and Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quære, whether by his
sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the Globe, which the Cube.”
Locke (1694/1979).
Altieri argues persuasively that answers to Molyneux’s question do not break down neatly across
nativist vs. empiricist lines, as only when a nativist view of concepts is combined with the further
thesis that sensory representations are either innately cross-modal or automatically translated into
a cross-modally common code, does such a view predict an affirmative answer to Molyneux’s
question. Absent such an assumption, the nativist can predict a negative answer instead.
Altieri is also correct in endorsing criticisms I have raised (Schwenkler, 2012, 2013; Connolly,
2013) against the resolution of Molyneux’s question attempted by Held et al. (2011). In this
study, newly sighted individuals could match seen objects with seen objects and felt with felt, but
could not match seen objects with felt ones, leading the authors to conclude that “the answer to
Molyneux’s question is likely negative,” as any innate link between vision and touch “is insufficient
for reconciling the identity of the separate sensory representations” (Held et al., 2011). But given the
evidence that newly sighted patients have only a limited capacity to form 3D visual representations
of complex objects (Fine et al., 2003; Ostrovsky et al., 2009), these individuals’ failure in the cross-
modal matching task could have been due to a purely visual deficit. Therefore, the study does not
establish anything about the relationship between visual and tactile representations.
Less persuasive, however, is Altieri’s proposal to substitute for Molyneux’s question a test of
whether newly sighted individuals exhibit the McGurk effect (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976).
Altieri suggests that the latter effect is evidence of a cross-modal connection between the auditory
and visual modalities, and so if it is observed prior to any relevant perceptual learning, the
association that underlies it must be innate. But not just any theory that predicts an affirmative
answer to Molyneux’s original question will also predict that newly sighted individuals will
exhibit the McGurk effect. This is because there could be differences in how phonemes and
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shapes, respectively, are cross-modally coded, or in the nature
of the cross-modal connections between vision and hearing as
opposed to those between vision and touch. This makes Altieri’s
question different fromMolyneux’s not just in the paradigms they
employ, but also in which hypotheses they manage to test.
More precisely, the difficulty for Altieri’s proposal is that there
can be different versions of what he calls the Common Code
Theory, i.e., the theory holding that perceptual representations
are both innate and amodal or cross-modal. First, versions of
the Common Code Theory may differ in which perceptible
properties they take to be commonly coded: e.g., it might
be thought that low-level spatial and temporal properties are
commonly coded, whereas high-level ones like abstract category
membership are not. Second, versions of the theory may differ
in which sensory modalities they take this code to be shared
between: e.g., it might be that vision and touch share an innately
common code, whereas the connections between thesemodalities
and those of smell and taste have to be learned (It is an interesting
question, which I can’t explore here, how exactly the Gibsonian
theories of “direct perception” that Altieri discusses would fit
into this framework). Importantly, the only version of the
Common Coding Theory that must predict an affirmative answer
to Molyneux’s original question is a version that postulates
an unlearned amodal or cross-modal representation of spatial
properties that is common to sight and touch. Such a modest
thesis would not entail that there is also such a connection
between the representation of phonemic properties in sight and
hearing, and so would not require making any prediction at all
regarding the McGurk effect in newly sighted individuals.
For it to work, then, Altieri’s proposal needs to be modified so
that the stimuli are more appropriate to the hypothesis at stake
in Molyneux’s original question. One way to do this would be
to explore sensory dominance effects in the interaction between
vision and touch. The McGurk effect is just one instance of a
wide range of intersensory effects discovered in recent decades,
and some of these concern cross-modal interactions within the
perception of spatial properties rather than phonemic ones (e.g.,
the ventriloquist effect; Alais and Burr, 2004), and interactions
between touch and vision rather than vision and hearing (e.g.,
the rubber hand illusion; Pavani et al., 2000)1. A version of the
Common Coding Theory that predicts an affirmative answer
to Molyneux’s question might also predict that phenomena like
these would be observed in the newly sighted, as prior to
any learned associations between vision and other modalities
their sensory systems would still resolve competition between
the commonly coded information present in these modalities.
It is possible, however, that newly sighted individuals might
show different patterns of sensory dominance than experienced
seers, e.g., visual experience might more often be captured by
competing tactile stimuli (Violentyev et al., 2005). Still, Altieri is
right that testing for some such cross-modal interactions would
be a promising way forward on this question.
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